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Addressing a question raised by Tourky and Yannelis (1998), we show
that given any non-separable Banach spaceE, and given any atomless mea-
sure space ￿T;T ;￿￿, there is an economy with￿T;T ;￿￿ as space of traders
and E as commodity space ful￿lling the usual standard assumptions but
having a core allocation not supportable as a Walrasian equilibrium, and
in fact, having no Walrasian equilibria at all. We shall also consider the
framework of economies with weakly compact consumption sets as devel-
oped by Khan and Yannelis (1991). We prove that in this setting the core of
an economy with a measure space of traders is non-empty, regardless of
whether or not the commodity space is separable. On the other hand, we
show that when the commodity space contains weakly compact subsets
that are non-separable, then, again, there are atomless economies for which
core-Walras equivalence fails. Thus, in particular, for very large commod-
ity spaces the notion of the core seems to be more robust than that of a
Walrasian equilibrium.
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This note addresses the problems of non-emptiness of the core and core-Walras
equivalence for an exchange economy with a measure space of traders, the
commodity space being a general Banach space. Recently, Tourky and Yannelis
(1998) showed that, when aggregation of individual commodity bundles is for-
malized in terms of the Bochner integral, given any atomless measure space
￿T;T ;￿￿ there is a non-separable Banach space E such that an economy with
￿T;T ;￿￿ as space of traders and E as commodity space can be constructed
that has a non-empty core but￿in spite of the fact that ￿T;T ;￿￿ is atomless,
and although several strong conditions are met 1￿does not have a Walrasian
equilibrium. Contrasting this result with the classical equilibrium existence and
core-Walras equivalence theorems of Aumann (1966, 1964) and their extensions
to commodity spaces being separable Banach spaces (e.g. Khan and Yannelis,
1991; Rustichini and Yannelis, 1991), Tourky and Yannelis (1998) convincingly
argued that the crucial condition behind these latter results is not only that the
space of traders is atomless but, in fact, that there are ￿many more agents than
commodities.￿2
Actually, the commodity space in the counter examples to core-Walras equiv-
alence presented by Tourky and Yannelis (1998) is a non-separableHilbert space.
At the end of their paper, however, Tourky and Yannelis raised the question as
to whether one can view the construction in these counter examples ￿as a con-
crete version of the proof of a more general result. One that characterizes a
class of Banach spaces as those spaces in which Bochner existence and Bochner
core-Walras equivalence hold?￿3 In this note we will attack this problem.
In our ￿rst contribution we show that, indeed, a core-Walras non-equivalence
result as in Tourky and Yannelis (1998) does not depend on the commodity
space being (isomorphic to) a Hilbert space, but actually holds in every non-
separable Banach space: We shall prove that given any such Banach space E,
and given any atomless measure space ￿T;T ;￿￿, there exists an economy with
E as commodity space and ￿T;T ;￿￿ as space of traders such that, as in Tourky
and Yannelis (1998), there is a core allocation not supportable as a Walrasian
equilibrium (in fact there are no Walrasian equilibria at all) but such that all the
conditions listed in Tourky and Yannelis (1998) under the term ￿desirable as-
sumptions￿ are ful￿lled: a) for some ordering onE, E is an ordered Banach space
so that E￿, the positive cone of E, has a non-empty interior; (b) endowments be-
1In particular, consumption sets have a non-empty interior.
2The paper of Tourky and Yannelis (1998) contains several re￿nements of this result and, in
particular, a discussion of the meanings and implications of various notions of measurability
with respect to allocations and preference pro￿les in this context.
3￿Bochner￿ referring to the use of the Bochner integral to formalize aggregation of individual
consumption bundles.
2long to the interior of E￿; (c) consumption sets are equal to E￿; (d) preferences
are complete preorderings and are continuous, convex and strictly monotone;
(e) the preference mapping is measurable in the sense of Aumann (1964) 4. Now
by the result of Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) mentioned above, when the com-
modity space is separable then core-Walras equivalence holds for any atomless
economy satisfying these assumptions.5 Thus, combining this latter result with
ours, we have established that the class fEg of Banach spaces such that, under
the ￿desirable assumptions,￿ any atomless economy with commodity spaceE
exhibits core-Walras equivalence is exactly the class of Banach spaces that are
separable.
Note, though, that when the commodity space is an abstract ordered Banach
space and consumption sets coincide with the positive cone, non-emptiness of
the core for an economy with a measure space of agents is in general impossible
to guarantee￿even if separability of the commodity space is assumed. The
reason is that, with such consumption sets, the set of feasible allocations lacks
suitable compactness properties; see Khan and Yannelis (1991) for a broader
discussion of this point. Thus, in this setting, the problem of core-Walras equiv-
alence tends to become empty in some sense. However, as shown in Khan and
Yannelis (1991), when the consumption sets of an economy with a measure
space of traders are assumed to be weakly compact, then in case of a separable
commodity space, Walrasian equilibria and thus core allocations do exist. 6 The
second result of our paper is now that under the hypothesis of weakly compact
consumption sets, the core of an economy with a measure space of traders is
non-empty, regardless of whether or not the commodity space is separable. On
the other hand, we show that given a Banach spaceE containing non-separable
weakly compact subsets, and given any atomless measure space￿T;T ;￿￿, there
is an economy with ￿T;T ;￿￿ as space of agents and E as commodity space that
satis￿es the assumptions of our core non-emptiness result (or even stronger
ones) but has no Walrasian equilibrium; in particular, core-Walras equivalence
does not hold. Thus, even in settings where core allocations in general exist, the
property of an economy being atomless does not guarantee core-Walras equiva-
lence when the commodity space is non-separable.
Finally, it will be shown that for an atomless economy where consump-
tion sets are weakly compact but separable (and do not vary too much among
4That is, given any two allocations the set of agents preferring what they get in the ￿rst
allocation to what they get in the second is measurable, allocations being de￿ned as Bochner
integrable (hence strongly measurable) functions.
5Actually, the assumptions employed by Rustichini and Yannelis (1991, Theorem 4.1) are
weaker than the ￿desirable assumptions;￿ in particular, preferences are not assumed to be con-
vex or complete. Note that measurability of the preference mapping as postulated in Rustichini
and Yannelis (1991, Theorem 4.1) can be derived from measurability of this mapping in the
sense of Aumann (e.g. by using the lemma in the appendix of our paper).
6Provided, of course, that certain standard assumptions are in force.
3agents) core-Walras equivalence holds. In particular, then, in view of our second
result, there must be a Walrasian equilibrium. Incidentally, this latter core equiv-
alence result shows that our non-equivalence result for economies with weakly
compact consumption sets has nothing to do with the fact that such consump-
tion sets may have an empty interior, but that it is indeed essential that they be
non-separable.
To sum up, under the condition that consumption sets be weakly compact
(and not too dispersed among agents), the classfEg of Banach spaces such that
for any atomless economy with commodity space E core-Walras equivalence
holds (and Walrasian equilibria do exist) consists of those Banach spaces having
no non-separable weakly compact subsets; in particular, the separable Banach
spaces belong to this class. On the other hand, this condition ensures that the
core is always non-empty. Thus, for ￿very large￿ commodity spaces the notion
of the core seems to be more robust than that of a Walrasian equilibrium.
One way to understand the reason underlying core-Walras non-equivalence
in non-separable commodity spaces when aggregation of individual commod-
ity bundles is formalized by means of the Bochner integral is to look at the
connection between the fact that a Bochner integrable allocation must be es-
sentially separably valued and the assumption that the preference mapping be
Aumann measurable. The requirement that allocations be essentially separably
valued implies that the property of an allocation being in the core is separably
determined in the sense that a feasible allocation is a core allocation already
when it is a core allocation relative to every separable subspace of the commod-
ity space. On the other hand, it makes the requirement that the preference map-
ping be Aumann measurable weak, so that across the separable subspaces of
the commodity space the pro￿le of agents’ preferences may be very dispersed.
As a consequence, since the property of an allocation being Walrasian is deter-
mined relative to the entire commodity space, the core may be larger than the
set of Walrasian allocations￿even when the economy in question is atomless.
More technically, this can be illustrated as follows. Supposef is a feasible allo-
cation of some (atomless) economy, and suppose there is a price systemp such
that relative to every ￿xed separable subspaceG of the commodity space almost
all agents are optimizing at p. Then, since allocations have to be almost separa-
bly valued, f is a core allocation.7 However, for any price system with the above
property, the exceptional set of measure zero of agents not optimizing relative
to G may vary with G￿which re￿ects the fact that the preferences pro￿le may
be dispersed across the separable subspaces of the commodity space￿so it
might well happen that the set of agents not optimizing relative to the entire
commodity space is a non-null set. That is,f need not be Walrasian.
7It may be shown that, conversely, for a given core allocation a price system such as above
exists (even when the commodity space is non-separable) provided the economy in question is
atomless and, say, the ￿desirable assumptions￿ hold.
4We ￿nish up the introduction with a remark concerning the method of proof.
In the Hilbert space setting of Tourky and Yannelis (1998), the core-Walras
non-equivalence result is derived by these authors by using the fact that a
non-separable Hilbert space has an orthonormal set with uncountably many
members. Now an orthonormal set in a Hilbert space can be seen as a spe-
cial case of a so called biorthogonal system, a concept that is de￿ned for any
Banach space. (Recall that given a Banach space E, a biorthogonal system is a
family ￿ei;e￿
i ￿i2I in E ￿ E￿ such that e￿
i ￿ej￿ ￿ ￿ij for all i;j 2 I, E￿ standing
for the dual space of E.) However, it is known that there are non-separable Ba-
nach spaces for which every biorthogonal system is countable. For this reason,
in the general Banach space setting one cannot proceed by using biorthogonal
systems. Instead, we shall use a result by JuhÆsz and Szentmikl￿ssy (1992) on
trans￿nite sequences in compact spaces, applied to the unit ball in the dual of
the commodity space, endowed with the weak ￿ topology. (See Section 4.1.)
2 Notation and Terminology
Let E be a real Banach space.
(a) The space E is said to be an ordered Banach space if it is endowed with
a vector ordering ￿ such that the positive cone E￿ ￿ fx 2 E: x ￿ 0g is closed
in E. By ￿￿ a vector ordering on E￿ we mean that ￿ is a re￿exive, transitive
and anti-symmetric binary relation onE such that x ￿ y entails x ￿ z ￿ y ￿ z
for any z 2 E, and ￿x ￿ ￿y for any real number ￿ ￿ 0. Thus, when E is an
ordered Banach space thenE￿ is a closed convex cone satisfyingE￿\￿E￿ ￿ f0g.
Recall that, conversely, any closed convex coneC with C \￿C ￿ f0g de￿nes, by
￿x ￿ y if and only if x ￿ y 2 C,￿ a vector ordering on E under which E is an
ordered Banach space with positive coneE￿ ￿ C.
(b) E￿ denotes the dual space of E, i.e. the space of all continuous linear
functions from E into R. If x 2 E and p 2 E￿, the value p￿x￿ of p at x will often
be denoted by hp;xi for notational convenience. When E is an ordered Banach
space, we write E￿
￿ for the set fp 2 E￿: p￿x￿ ￿ 0 for all x 2 E￿g.
(c) BE denotes the closed unit ball of E, i.e. BE ￿ fx 2 E: kxk ￿ 1g.
(d) ￿BE￿;weak
￿￿ denotes the closed unit ball ofE￿, endowed with the weak￿
topology.
(e) Let A be a subset of E. Then:
￿ intA denotes the (norm) interior of A;
￿ c‘A or ﬂ A denote the (norm) closure of A;
￿ coA denotes the convex hull of A;
￿ spanA denotes the linear span of A;
￿ hp;Ai, p 2 E￿, denotes the set fp￿x￿: x 2 Ag.
(f) Let p 2 E￿. Then:
5￿ kerp denotes the kernel of p, i.e. kerp ￿ fx 2 E: p￿x￿ ￿ 0g.
(g) B￿E￿ denotes the Borel ￿-algebra of E.
(h) Let ￿T;T ;￿￿ be a measure space. Then:
￿ Given a mapping f : T ! E, by ￿f is integrable￿ we always mean f is Bochner
integrable.
￿ Given a correspondence ’: T ! 2E,
R
T ’￿t￿d￿￿t￿ means the set
￿
z 2 E: z ￿
Z
T
f￿t￿d￿￿t￿ for some (Bochner) integrable function
f : T ! E with f￿t￿ 2 ’￿t￿ for almost all t 2 T
￿
:
3 The Model and the Results
3.1 The Basic Model
Let E be an ordered Banach space. An economy E with commodity space E is a
pair ￿￿T;T ;￿￿;￿X￿t￿;￿t;e￿t￿￿t2T￿ where
￿ ￿T;T ;￿￿ is a complete ￿nite measure space of agents;8
￿ X￿t￿ ￿ E￿ is the consumption set of agentt;
￿ ￿t ￿ X￿t￿ ￿ X￿t￿ is the preference/indi￿erence relation of agentt;
￿ e￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿ is the initial endowment of agentt;
and where the endowment mapping e: T ! E, given by t , e￿t￿, is assumed to
be integrable9.
An allocation (assignment) is an integrable function f : T ! E such that







Thus our feasibility notion allows for free disposal. We follow the model of Khan
and Yannelis (1991) in this respect. (See however Remarks 2 and 7.)
A Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E is a pair ￿p;f￿ where f is a feasi-
ble allocation and p 2 E￿
￿￿f0g is a price system such that for almost allt 2 T:
(i) hp;f￿t￿i ￿ hp;e￿t￿i and
(ii) if x 2 X￿t￿ satis￿es x ￿t f￿t￿ then hp;xi > hp;e￿t￿i.
8Whenever we speak of a measure space, the measure in question is meant to be positive
and non-zero.
9As said in the previous section, throughout this paper ￿integrable￿ means ￿Bochner inte-
grable.￿ We do not discuss the implications of other notions of integrability in the context of
the core equivalence problem.
6(By requiring an equilibrium price system to be positive we follow the model
of Khan and Yannelis (1991) again. Of course, the positivity requirement on
equilibrium price systems can be seen as a consequence of the free disposal
assumption embodied in the de￿nition of feasibility. See also Remarks 3 and 8.)
A feasible allocation f is said to be a Walrasian allocation if there is a
p 2 E￿
￿ ￿f0g such that ￿p;f￿ is a Walrasian equilibrium. An allocation f is a
core allocation if it is feasible and if there does not exist a coalitionS 2 T with





S e￿t￿d￿￿t￿, i.e. g is feasible for S, and
(ii) g￿t￿ ￿t f￿t￿ for almost all t 2 S.
We denote byC￿E￿ the set of all core allocations of the economyE and by W￿E￿
the set of Walrasian allocations.
We shall make use of the following standard assumptions:
(A1) X￿t￿ is closed and convex for every t 2 T.
(Note that by de￿nition of an economy,e￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿, i.e., X￿t￿ is non-empty.)
(A2) ￿t is re￿exive, transitive, and complete for everyt 2 T.
(A3) For every t 2 T, ￿t is continuous, i.e. for each x 2 X￿t￿ the sets
fy 2 X￿t￿: y ￿t xg and fy 2 X￿t￿: x ￿t yg are closed in X￿t￿.
(A4) For every t 2 T, ￿t is convex, i.e. for each x 2 X￿t￿ the set
fy 2 X￿t￿: y ￿t xg is convex.
(A5) If f and g are any two allocations then ft 2 T : f￿t￿ ￿t g￿t￿g is a mea-
surable set, i.e. it belongs to T . (￿Aumann measurability￿ of the pro￿le of
agents’ preferences.)
3.2 Economies where consumption sets are equal to the positive cone
of the commodity space
Let E be an ordered Banach space whose positive cone has a non-empty inte-
rior, and let E ￿ ￿￿T;T ;￿￿;￿X￿t￿;￿t;e￿t￿￿t2T￿ be an economy with commodity
space E. In addition to the conditions listed in the previous section, we take the
following ones into consideration in this section.
(B1) e￿t￿ 2 intE￿ for every t 2 T.
(B2) X￿t￿ ￿ E￿ for every t 2 T.
(B3) For every t 2 T, ￿t is strictly monotone, i.e. whenever x;x0 2 X￿t￿ with
x ￿ x0 but x 6￿ x0 then x ￿t x0.
7Note that (B2) makes (A1) redundant, and recall from the introduction that (A2)
to (A5) and (B1) to (B3) together yield what is called the ￿desirable assumptions￿
in Tourky and Yannelis (1998).
We are ready to formulate our ￿rst result.
Theorem 1. Let ￿T;T ;￿￿ be an arbitrary atomless complete ￿nite measure space,
and let E be any non-separable Banach space. Assume the continuum hypothesis.
Then there is an ordering￿ on E under which E is an ordered Banach space with
intE￿ 6￿ ; and an economy E ￿ ￿￿T;T ;￿￿;￿X￿t￿;￿t;e￿t￿￿t2T￿ with commodity
space E such that (A1) to (A5) and (B1) to (B3) are satis￿ed but
C￿E￿ 6￿ W￿E￿; moreover, W￿E￿ ￿ ;:
Remark 1. As was noted in the introduction, when the commodity spaceE is
separable then for an atomless economy ful￿lling the ￿desirable assumptions￿
core-Walras equivalence holds. Therefore, Theorem 1 implies that (under the
continuum hypothesis) the class of Banach spaces for which (taken as com-
modity spaces) every atomless economy ful￿lling the ￿desirable assumptions￿
exhibits core-Walras equivalence is exactly the class of Banach spaces that are
separable.
Remark 2. Evidently, under assumptions (B2) and (B3), a core allocationf of an





t e￿t￿d￿￿t￿ must be equal. Thus, the core-Walras non-
equivalence result in Theorem 1 cannot be attributed to the fact that our feasi-
bility de￿nition allows for free disposal.
Remark 3. We have required an equilibrium price system to belong toE￿
￿, i.e.
to be positive and continuous. However, the result of Theorem 1 is not depen-
dent on these requirements. Indeed, under (B2) and (B3) an equilibrium price
system is automatically positive, and when intE￿ 6￿ ; then every positive linear
functional on E is continuous.
Remark 4. If the economy satis￿es (B2) and (B3), an equilibrium price systemp
must in fact be strictly positive, i.e.p￿x￿ > 0 must hold for allx 2 E￿￿f0g. In the
proof of Theorem 1,E￿ will be constructed so that strictly positive price systems
exist. Thus the result of Theorem 1 cannot be blamed on a missing of such
price systems. We also remark here that E￿ will have the property that every
continuous linear functional on E is the di￿erence of two continuous positive
linear functionals. Thus E￿ will actually be rich in positive elements.
Remark 5. In the presence of (B1), (B2) and (A3), any quasi-equilibrium of an
economy is in fact a Walrasian equilibrium (regardless of positivity or conti-
nuity requirements on price systems). Hence, denoting by Q￿E￿ the set of all
quasi-equilibrium allocations of an economyE, Theorem 1 continues to be true
if in its statement ￿W￿E￿￿ is replaced by ￿Q￿E￿.￿
83.3 Economies with weakly compact consumption sets
The treatment in this section is based on the framework of economies with
weakly compact consumption sets, introduced by Khan and Yannelis (1991). Let
E be an ordered Banach space whose positive cone has a non-empty interior and
let E ￿ ￿￿T;T ;￿￿;￿X￿t￿;￿t;e￿t￿￿t2T￿ be an economy with commodity spaceE.
Following Khan and Yannelis (1991), we will take the following assumptions into
consideration:
(C1) X￿t￿ is weakly compact for every t 2 T.
(C2) The correspondence X￿￿￿: T ! 2E is integrably bounded; that is to say,
there is an integrable function ￿: T ! R￿ such that for each t 2 T,
supfkxk: x 2 X￿t￿g ￿ ￿￿t￿.
(C3) f￿t;x￿ 2 T ￿ E: x 2 X￿t￿g 2 T ￿ B￿E￿; that is, the graph of the consump-
tion sets correspondence X￿￿￿: T ! 2E belongs to T ￿ B￿E￿.
(C4) There is a separable subset J of E￿ such that for every t 2 T there is an
x￿
t 2 J \ X￿t￿ such that e￿t￿ ￿ x￿
t is an interior point of E￿.10
To make a remark concerning the role of these assumptions in the proof
of the result presented below about non-emptiness of the core of an economy,
(C1) and (C2) (together with convexity of the X￿t￿’s) will ensure that the set
of feasible allocations has suitable compactness properties. (C3) and (C4) will,
in particular, allow us to apply some known equilibrium existence theorems to
the restrictions of the economy to certain separable subspaces of the commod-
ity space. In the context of those theorems, (C3) is used to obtain non-empty
aggregate demand sets, and (C4) to overcome minimum wealth problems.
Note that under (A1), (A3) and (A4), preferences are weakly upper semicon-
tinuous. Hence, if (A2) and (C1) too hold then preferences have satiation points.
With respect to this, we shall consider the following conditions:
(C5) For every t 2 T, if x 2 X￿t￿ is a satiation point for ￿t then x ￿ e￿t￿.
(C6) For every t 2 T, if x 2 X￿t￿ is not a satiation point for ￿t then x belongs
to the closure of fy 2 X￿t￿: y ￿t xg. (Local non-satiation at non-satiation
points).
Finally, we introduce a condition requiring that consumption sets do not
vary too much among agents. Observe that this condition automatically holds
when the commodity space E is separable.
(C7) There is a countable set T0￿ T such that
S
t2T0X￿t￿ is dense in
S
t2T X￿t￿.
10Of course, if the commodity space is separable, then the word ￿separable￿ in the statement
of (C4) is super￿uous.
9Now when the commodity space of an economy is separable, then assump-
tions (A1) to (A5) together with (C1) to (C6) ensure that Walrasian equilibria (and
hence core allocations) do exist. (See Khan and Yannelis, 1991, Main Theorem, or
Podczeck, 1997, Theorem 5.1.11) Our next theorem says that these assumptions
ensure non-emptiness of the core even without separability.
Theorem 2. Let E be any ordered Banach space withintE￿ 6￿ ; and let E be an
economy with commodity space E which satis￿es assumptions (A1) to (A5) and
(C1) to (C4). Then
C￿E￿ 6￿ ;:
See Section 4.1 for the proof. Note that assumptions (C5) to (C7) are actually
not needed in Theorem 2.
Remark 6. We have not investigated the question of whether in the setting of
weakly compact consumption sets there are conditions su￿cient to guarantee
the existence of core allocations without fee disposal, i.e. of core allocations
where feasibility holds with equality. We leave this as an open problem.
We will ￿nally present two theorems which, combined and viewed together
with Theorem 2, give the result that (under the continuum hypothesis) the class
of Banach spaces for which (taken as commodity spaces) every atomless econ-
omy ful￿lling (A1) to (A5) and (C1) to (C7) has a Walrasian equilibrium and
exhibits core-Walras equivalence consists of those Banach spaces that do not
contain non-separable weakly compact subsets.
Theorem 3. Let ￿T;T ;￿￿ be an arbitrary atomless complete ￿nite measure space,
and let E be any Banach space containing a non-separable weakly compact sub-
set. Assume the continuum hypothesis. Then there is an ordering ￿ on E un-
der which E is an ordered Banach space with intE￿ 6￿ ; and an economy
E ￿ ￿￿T;T ;￿￿;￿X￿t￿;￿t;e￿t￿￿t2T￿ with commodity space E such that (A1) to
(A5) and (C1) to (C7) are satis￿ed but
C￿E￿ 6￿ W￿E￿; moreover, W￿E￿ ￿ ;:
This remains true even when (C7) is sharpened to
(C7’) For some X ￿ E￿, X￿t￿ ￿ X for all t 2 T.
11Actually, in these theorems measurability of the graph of the preference mapping is as-
sumed instead of condition (A5). However, by using the lemma in the appendix of our paper,
the proofs of these theorems go through under (A5). It should be remarked here as well that
Khan and Yannelis (1991) do not use conditions (C5) and (C6). On the other hand, it is as-
sumed by these authors that for some norm compact subset of the commodity space, sayC,
the endowment of each trader belongs toC.
10See Section 4.2 for the proof and see also the remarks at the end of this
section. Note that when combined with Theorem 2, Theorem 3 implies, in par-
ticular, that for very large commodity spaces the notion of the core is more
robust than that of a Walrasian equilibrium.
The following theorem is actually a variant of a core equivalence result of
Rustichini and Yannelis (1991). The main di￿erence is that in their model the
consumption sets coincide with the positive cone of the commodity space.
Theorem 4. Let E be an ordered Banach space with intE￿ 6￿ ; and let E be an
economy with commodity space E which satis￿es assumptions (A1) to (A3), (A5),
and (C2) to (C7). Assume in addition that the measure space￿T;T ;￿￿ of agents
is atomless and that
(C8) X￿t￿ is separable for every t 2 T.
Then
W￿E￿ ￿ C￿E￿:
The proof (which is an adaptation of that in Rustichini and Yannelis (1991,
Theorem 4.1) to the framework dealt with here) is contained in Section 4.3. Note
that (C1) and the convexity assumption (A4) are not needed in Theorem 4. 12 Also
note that this theorem shows, in particular, that the result of Theorem 3 cannot
be blamed on the fact that weakly compact sets may have an empty interior, but
indeed depends on whether the commodity space in question contains weakly
compact sets being non-separable.
We close this section with a couple of remarks concerning Theorem 3.
Remark 7. The result of Theorem 3 does not depend on the fact that our de-
￿nition of feasible allocations allows for free disposal. In fact, in the proof of
this theorem a core allocation not supportable as a Walrasian equilibrium will
be produced for which the feasibility condition is satis￿ed with equality.
Remark 8. Theorem 3 continues to be valid when the positivity and continu-
ity requirements on an equilibrium price system are dropped. See the remark
following the proof of this theorem.
Remark 9. Let us call a quasi-equilibriumnon-trivial if there is a set, of measure
> 0, of consumers having a commodity bundle in the consumption set with a
value smaller than that of the endowment. Thus, under a suitable irreducibil-
ity assumption a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium will turn out to be a Walrasian
equilibrium. Let b Q￿E￿ denote the set of all allocations belonging to a non-trivial
quasi-equilibrium of an economyE. Theorem 3 remains true if in its statement
￿W￿E￿￿ is replaced by ￿ b Q￿E￿.￿ Again, see the remark following the proof of this
theorem.
12Would we replace ￿integrable￿ in the de￿nition of an allocation by ￿strongly measurable,￿
which would amount to a strengthening of (A5), then (C2) would be unnecessary as well.
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4.1 Preliminaries
The principal mathematical tool in order to prove Theorems 1 and 3 is provided
by the following:
Proposition. Let X be a non-separable Banach space and assume the continuum
hypothesis. Then, denoting by !1 the ￿rst uncountable ordinal number, there is
a trans￿nite sequence ￿f￿￿￿<!1 of elements of X￿ such that
(a) f￿ 6￿ 0 and kf￿k ￿ 1 for all ordinals ￿ 2 ￿0;!1￿; but
(b) if S is any separable subset of X then there is an ordinal ￿S < !1 such that
for each ￿ 2 ￿￿S;!1￿, f￿￿x￿ ￿ 0 for all x 2 S.13
Proof. Since X is non-separable, ￿BX￿;weak
￿￿ is not ￿rst-countable at 0. (See
e.g. the proof of Corollary 2 in Holmes, 1975, p.72.) Therefore, and because
of the continuum hypothesis, it follows from JuhÆsz and Szentmikl￿ssy (1992,
Corollary 2.1 and the lines before the statement of that result) that there exists
a trans￿nite sequence ￿f￿￿￿<!1 in BX￿ that converges to 0 with respect to the
weak￿ topology, but such that f￿ 6￿ 0 for all ￿ 2 ￿0;!1￿. In particular, (a) of
the proposition holds for such a sequence. To see that (b) holds as well, simply
note that ￿f￿ ! 0 in ￿BX￿;weak
￿￿ as ￿ " !1￿ means that given any x 2 X and
n 2 N there is a ￿ < !1 such that jf￿￿x￿j < 1=n for all ￿ < !1 with ￿ > ￿, and
recall that if A is any countable set of ordinals ￿ < !1 then there is an ordinal
￿ < !1 such that for each ￿ 2 A, ￿ < ￿.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Pick some e 2 E with kek ￿ 3 and let C be the cone generated by feg ￿ BE, i.e.
C ￿ fx 2 E: x ￿ ￿￿e ￿ y￿;y 2 BE;￿ ￿ 0g:
Then C is convex, and since e ￿ BE, C is closed and C \ ￿C ￿ f0g. Thus C
generates a vector ordering on E under which E becomes an ordered Banach
space with positive cone E￿ equal to C.14 Of course, intE￿ 6￿ ;; in particular,
e 2 intE￿.
We will now construct an economy for the given measure space￿T;T ;￿￿ of
agents. Concerning consumption sets and endowments, for each individualt in
T we let the endowment e￿t￿ be equal to e and the consumption set X￿t￿ equal
13If ￿;￿ are ordinal numbers then ￿￿;￿￿ denotes the ordinal interval f￿: ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿g.
14It is easily seen that the coneE￿ so constructed is normal, i.e. has not an excessive ￿width;￿
in particular, order intervals are norm bounded, and every element ofE￿ is the di￿erence of
two elements of E￿
￿. Cf. Kelley and Namioka (1976, pp. 227 and 228).
12to E￿. Clearly this assignment of endowments and consumption sets satis￿es
assumptions (B1) and (B2) (hence also (A1)). Further, since the measure ￿ is
￿nite, the endowment mappingt , e is integrable, as required in our de￿nition
of an economy.
With regard to the construction of preferences, ￿rst recall that, by assump-
tion, the continuum hypothesis is in force and the measure space￿T;T ;￿￿ is
atomless. Therefore, by using Proposition 3.3 in Tourky and Yannelis (1998),
we may write T ￿
S
￿<!1 N￿ where !1 stands for the ￿rst uncountable ordinal
number and ￿N￿￿￿<!1 is a family of pairwise disjoint null sets inT. Denote by
￿: T ! ￿0;!1￿ the mapping that takes a t 2 T to that ordinal number ￿ for
which t 2 N￿.
Now let ￿f￿￿￿<!1 be a family of elements of E￿ chosen according to the
proposition in Section 4.1, and for each t 2 T let qt ￿ f￿￿t￿. Then according
to (a) of the proposition
(4.1) qt 6￿ 0 and kqtk ￿ 1 for all t 2 T,
and from (b) of the proposition:
For any given separable subsetS of E the set
ft 2 T : qt￿s￿ 6￿ 0 for some s 2 Sg is a null set in T,
(4.2)






each N￿0 is a null set, and for each ￿ < !1 the set ￿0;￿￿ is countable.
Finally, use the Hahn Banach theorem to ￿nd a b q 2 E￿ with kb qk ￿ 1 and
b q￿e￿ ￿ 3￿as is possible since kek ￿ 3￿and then for each t 2 T, de￿ne a utility
function ut: E￿ ! R by
ut￿x￿ ￿ b q￿x￿ ￿ qt￿x￿; x 2 E￿:
The family of preferences so de￿ned satis￿es assumptions (A2) to (A5) as
well as (B3). Indeed, this is clear for (A2) to (A4). Concerning (B3), ￿rst note that
in view of (4.2), we may as well assume that qt￿e￿ ￿ 0 holds for all t 2 T (by
modifying the mapping t , qt on a null set if necessary). Then for allt 2 T and
each y 2 BE:
￿b q ￿ qt￿￿e ￿ y￿ ￿ b q￿e￿ ￿ b q￿y￿ ￿ qt￿y￿ ￿ 3 ￿ 1 ￿ 1 > 0
whence ￿b q￿qt￿￿x￿ > 0 for each x 2 E￿￿f0g. That is, if x;x0 2 E￿ satisfy x ￿ x0
and x 6￿ x0 (i.e. x ￿ x0 2 E￿￿f0g) then ￿b q ￿ qt￿￿x ￿ x0￿ > 0 i.e. ut￿x￿ > ut￿x0￿.
Thus we have (B3). For (A5), recall that by de￿nition, an allocation is a function
that is Bochner integrable and hence almost separably valued. Thus from (4.2):
If h: T ! E￿ is an allocation then
for almost all t 2 T, ut￿h￿t￿￿ ￿ hb q;h￿t￿i.
(4.3)
13Consequently, since a Bochner integrable function is weakly measurable, and
since the measure space ￿T;T ;￿￿ is complete, given any allocation h: T ! E￿
the mapping t , ut￿h￿t￿￿ is measurable. It is plain that this implies (A5).
Record for future reference that the element b q of E￿ is positive. Indeed, for
any y 2 BE, b q￿e ￿ y￿ > 3 ￿ 1 > 0 whence b q￿x￿ ￿ 0 for each x 2 E￿.
To sum up, an economy for the given measure space of traders has been
found such that the assumptions listed in the statement of Theorem 1 all hold.
We are now going to show that this economy has no Walrasian equilibrium.
Arguing by contradiction, suppose there is a Walrasian equilibrium, say￿p;f￿.
Then
R








since b q 2 E￿
￿. Also, since for each t 2 T the endowment point e belongs to the
budget set, we must have ut￿f￿t￿￿ ￿ ut￿e￿ for almost all t 2 T. Now from (4.3),
for almost everyt 2 T both ut￿f￿t￿￿ ￿ b q￿f￿t￿￿ and ut￿e￿ ￿ b q￿e￿. Consequently,
b q￿f￿t￿￿ ￿ b q￿e￿ for almost all t 2 T, whence, from (4.4), b q￿f￿t￿￿ ￿ b q￿e￿ for
almost all t 2 T. It follows that for almost everyt 2 T, ut￿e￿ ￿ ut￿f￿t￿￿, whence
the pairing of p with the initial allocation t , e is a Walrasian equilibrium also.
But e is in the interior of the consumption setE￿, so the equilibrium conditions
for the pair ￿p;t , e￿ imply that for almost allt 2 T, kerp ￿ ker￿b q￿qt￿; that is,
by a standard fact from linear algebra, for almost everyt 2 T there exists a real
number ￿t such that b q ￿ qt ￿ ￿tp. However, this means there must be a z 2 E
for which qt￿z￿ 6￿ 0 for almost all t 2 T. Indeed, in case b q 6￿ ￿p for every real
number ￿, take any z 2 E with b q￿z￿ 6￿ 0 but p￿z￿ ￿ 0. Consider the other case,
i.e. assume that b q ￿ ￿p for some ￿. Then for almost every t 2 T, qt ￿ ￿tp for
some ￿t, and since according to (4.1),qt 6￿ 0 for all t 2 T, it follows again that for
some z 2 E, qt￿z￿ 6￿ 0 for almost all t 2 T. But ￿qt￿z￿ 6￿ 0 for almost all t 2 T￿
is impossible by virtue of (4.2), and we have thus arrived at a contradiction,
proving that W￿E￿ ￿ ; where E stands for the economy constructed.
To complete the proof, we must show that C￿E￿ is non-empty. In fact, we
show that C￿E￿ contains the initial allocationt , e. To this end, ￿x any coalition
C 2 T with ￿￿C￿ > 0 and let f : T ! E￿ be an allocation which is feasible
for C. Thus,
R







(recall: b q is positive), whence
R
Chb q;f￿t￿id￿￿t￿ ￿ ￿￿C￿hb q;ei. But therefore, in
view of (4.3), ut￿f￿t￿￿ > ut￿e￿ cannot hold for almost all t 2 C, and it follows
that the initial allocation t , e indeed belongs to C￿E￿ as predicted. The proof
of Theorem 1 is complete.
144.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Assume ￿rst that E is separable. In this case, the assumptions of the theorem
guarantee that one can use the arguments of Khan and Yannelis (1991) or Pod-
czeck (1997, Theorem 5.1), together with part (i) of the lemma in the Appendix,







(ii) for almost all t 2 T: if x 2 X￿t￿ satis￿es x ￿t f￿t￿ then hp;xi > hp;e￿t￿i.
(With respect to Khan and Yannelis (1991) note that their assumption of a norm
compact subset of E that contains the endowments of all agents can be dropped
by using a suitable approximation argument. With respect to Podczeck (1997,
Theorem 5.1) note that his assumptions (B-4) and (B-5) are not needed if the
price/allocation pair ￿p;f￿ is required to satisfy only (i) and (ii) above but not
the budget conditions of a Walrasian equilibrium; also, his conditions (A-1) and
(A-2) can be dropped if, as in the present theorem, preferences are assumed to
be convex.)
Our proof now proceeds by application of the just made observation to the
restrictions of the economyE to the elements of some directed set of separable
subspaces of E, followed by a limit argument to obtain a core allocation.
To begin with, consider the endowment mappingt , e￿t￿. By de￿nition of
an economy, it is integrable, hence almost separably valued; we may as well
modify the economy E on a null set of T if necessary and assume that for some
separable subset H of E, e￿t￿ is in H for each t 2 T. Now let J be a subset of E￿
as guaranteed by Assumption (C4). In particular, J is separable and hence the
same is true of H [ J. Let F denote the collection of all separable closed linear
subspaces F of E with F ￿ H [ J. Note that by choice of H and J:
For each t 2 T there is an x￿
t 2 X￿t￿ such that
for all F 2 F, x￿
t 2 F and e￿t￿ ￿ x￿
t 2 F \ intE￿.
(4.5)
We provide each F 2 F with the relative ordering of E. Then each F 2 F is
also an ordered Banach space, and we have F￿ ￿ F \ E￿. Now for each F 2 F
and each t 2 T, let
XF￿t￿ ￿ X￿t￿ \ F, and let
￿F
t be the restriction of ￿t to XF￿t￿.
In particular, then, e￿t￿ 2 XF￿t￿ ￿ F￿, and thus EF given by
EF ￿ ￿￿T;T ;￿￿;￿XF￿t￿;￿F
t ;e￿t￿￿t2T￿
is an economy with commodity space F. (Evidently, the endowment mapping
t , e￿t￿, being integrable as a mapping into E, is integrable when considered
15as mapping into F, too.) Given any F 2 F, the economy EF satis￿es the same
assumptions as the original economyE. Indeed, this is obvious for (A1) to (A4)
and (C2). As for (A5), simply note that an integrable mapping fromT into F is
also integrable when viewed as mapping taking values inE. That (C1) holds is
immediate from the fact that the weak topology ofF coincides with the relative
weak topology ofF as a subspace ofE. That (C3) holds follows from the fact that
the inclusion of T ￿ F into T ￿ E is T ￿ B￿F￿￿T ￿ B￿E￿ measurable (because
B￿F￿ ￿ fB \ F : B 2 B￿E￿g). Concerning (C4), ￿nally, note thatF \intE￿ ￿ intF￿
(intF￿ meaning the interior of F￿ in F, of course). Hence (4.5) can be reformu-
lated to state:
For each t 2 T there is an x￿
t 2 E￿ such that for all F 2 F,
x￿
t 2 X￿t￿ \ F and e￿t￿ ￿ x￿
t 2 intF￿ (intF￿ the interior of F￿ in F).
(4.6)
Thus, (C4) is satis￿ed for the economies EF, too. We may therefore use the
observation made at the beginning of this proof to choose, for eachF 2 F, an
integrable mapping fF : T ! E and a point pF 2 F￿





fF￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿ for almost all t 2 T, and (4.7b)
for almost all t 2 T,
if x 2 X￿t￿ \ F satis￿es x ￿t fF￿t￿ then hpF;xi > hpF;e￿t￿i.
(4.7c)
For future reference we remark:
(4.8)
There is a u 2 E such that for each F 2 F, u 2 intF￿ and pF￿u￿ > 0
(intF￿ meaning the interior of F￿ in F).
(Indeed, pF 2 F￿
￿￿f0g means pF￿x￿ > 0 for all x 2 intF￿ and according to (4.6)
there is a u 2 E such that u 2 intF￿ for each F 2 F.)
Preparing for a limit argument, consider the Banach space L1￿￿;E￿ of all
(￿-equivalence classes of) Bochner integrable functionsh from ￿T;T ;￿￿ into E,
the norm being given by khk1 ￿
R
kh￿t￿k d￿￿t￿. Let
B ￿ fh 2 L1￿￿;E￿: h￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿ for almost all t 2 Tg:
We claim B is a weakly compact set inL1￿￿;E￿. Indeed, by Assumption (C2),B is
both bounded inL1￿￿;E￿ and uniformly integrable. But these facts together with
the fact that each X￿t￿ is weakly compact in E (Assumption (C1)) imply that B
is weakly relatively compact inL1￿￿;E￿ (see Diestel, Ruess, and Schachermayer,
1993, Corollary 2.6). Now B is a (norm) closed subset of L1￿￿;E￿ (since each
X￿t￿ is closed, and since a (norm) convergent sequence in L1￿￿;E￿, say with
limit g, has a subsequence that converges to g pointwise almost everywhere
in the norm of E). But since each X￿t￿ is convex (Assumption (A1)), B is too,
16and hence B is in fact weakly closed. We may conclude thatB is indeed weakly
compact in L1￿￿;E￿, as advertised.
According to (4.7b), B contains fF for each F 2 F (identifying each fF with
its ￿-equivalence class). Evidently F is a directed set under inclusion (since the
closed linear span of two elements of F is again separable, hence in F). Thus
the family ￿fF￿F2F is a net in B, and since this latter set was shown to be weakly
compact in L1￿￿;E￿, we may assume there is an f 2 B such that fF ! f weakly
in L1￿￿;E￿ (by passing to a subnet if necessary).
We assert that f is a core allocation for the economy E. To see this, ￿rst
observe that f being in B we have f￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿ for almost all t 2 T. That is,
f is an allocation. Next, note that the operator h ,
R
hd￿, h 2 L1￿￿;E￿, is
(norm) continuous, thus (by a standard fact￿see Dunford and Schwartz, 1958,
Theorem 15, p. 422) continuous for the weak topologies ofE and L1￿￿;E￿, too.





i.e. the allocation f is feasible. Now to see that f is in fact in the core, we shall
establish the following
Claim: Given any G 2 F, there is a p 2 G￿
￿ such that for almost every t 2 T,
if x 2 X￿t￿ \ G satis￿es x ￿t f￿t￿ then p￿x￿ > p￿e￿t￿￿.
Assuming for the time being that the claim has been veri￿ed, we can continue
as follows. Suppose f is not in the core. Then, since f is a feasible allocation,
there is a coalition S with ￿￿S￿ > 0 and an integrable function g: T ! E such





mapping g being integrable, hence almost separably valued, an elementG can
be chosen from F so that for almost all t 2 T, g￿t￿ 2 G. (Indeed, whenever A is
a separable subset of E, the closed linear span of A [ H [ J is an element of F,





S e￿t￿d￿￿t￿ are in G. Now choosing a p 2 G￿ in accor-



































and we thus arrive at a contradiction, proving thatf is a core allocation.
It remains to show that the above claim is correct. Thus letG 2 F. Returning
to the net ￿fF￿F2F, consider the set Z ￿ L1￿￿;E￿ given by Z ￿ ffF : F ￿ Gg.
Evidently Z is weakly relatively compact in L1￿￿;E￿, the fF’s belonging to the
17weakly compact subset B of L1￿￿;E￿. In addition, f is a weak cluster point of
Z because the net ￿fF￿F2F converges to f weakly in L1￿￿;E￿. Recall now that
every Banach space is angelic15 in its weak topology. Applying this fact to the
present situation, ￿nd a sequence￿fn￿
1
n￿1 in Z with fn ! f, weakly in L1￿￿;E￿.
From above, for each n we have a pn 2 G￿
￿ such that:
For almost every t 2 T, for all n,
if x 2 X￿t￿ \ G satis￿es x ￿t fn￿t￿ then hpn;xi > hpn;e￿t￿i.
(4.9)
For some u 2 intG￿, pn￿u￿ ￿ 1 for all n
(intG￿ the interior of G￿ in G).
(4.10)
(Note: each fn equals fF for some F 2 F with F ￿ G. The pn’s are obtained
by restricting the appropriate pF’s to G; by virtue of (4.8) we can renormalize
so as to get (4.10).) Each pn being in G￿
￿, (4.10) implies that the sequence ￿pn￿
is (norm) bounded. Therefore, since G is separable, it has a weak￿ convergent
subsequence, say￿pnk￿ with limit p; let ￿fnk￿ be the corresponding subsequence
of ￿fn￿. Note that p 2 G￿
￿￿f0g and that, for each k, fnk￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿ for almost all
t 2 T.
Since ￿fnk￿, being a subsequence of ￿fn￿, converges to f weakly in L1￿￿;E￿,
there exists a sequence ￿gk￿ with gk 2 coffnm : m ￿ kg such that ￿gk￿t￿￿ con-
verges to f￿t￿ in the norm of E for almost every t 2 T. (See Diestel, Ruess,
and Schachermayer, 1993, Theorem 2.1.) By convexity of the setsX￿t￿ (Assump-
tion (A1)), for almost every t 2 T we must have gk￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿ for all k. Thus
by completeness and upper semicontinuity of preferences (Assumptions (A2)
and (A3)), for almost every t 2 T, if x 2 X￿t￿ satis￿es x ￿t f￿t￿ then there
is a k0 (possibly depending on x and t) such that x ￿t gk￿t￿ for all k ￿ k0.
Since preferences are convex (Assumption (A4)) it follows that, for almost every
t 2 T, if x 2 X￿t￿ satis￿es x ￿t f￿t￿ then x ￿t fnk￿t￿ for in￿nitely many k.
Hence from (4.9), for almost every t 2 T, if x 2 X￿t￿ \ G satis￿es x ￿t f￿t￿
then hpnk;xi > hpnk;e￿t￿i for in￿nitely many k. But therefore, for almost every
t 2 T, if x 2 X￿t￿ \ G satis￿es x ￿t f￿t￿ then hp;xi ￿ hp;e￿t￿i because
pnk ! p weak￿ in G￿. Now p belongs to G￿
￿￿f0g so for all v 2 intG￿, p￿v￿ > 0
(as before, intG￿ meaning the interior of G￿ in G). Hence, using (4.6) (together
with the hypotheses that preferences are lower semicontinuous and consump-
tion sets are convex), we can conclude that, for almost allt 2 T, if x 2 X￿t￿\G
satis￿es x ￿t f￿t￿ then, in fact, hp;xi > hp;e￿t￿i. This completes the veri￿ca-
tion of the claim above, thus ￿nishing the proof of Theorem 2.
Remark 10. Observe that the allocation f obtained in the proof just given need
not be Walrasian. This would be so even if the above claim were to be validated
15Recall that a topological space Y is called angelic if for every relatively countably compact
set A ￿ Y the following are true: (a) A relatively compact, and (b) for eachx in the closure of A
there is a sequence in A that converges to x.
18for (the restrictions to theG 2 F of) a single p 2 E￿ and, in addition, the budget
condition were to hold for almost allt 2 T. The reason is that the exceptional set
of measure zero of agents not optimizing relative toG at p may vary withG 2 F.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 3
This proof closely follows that of Theorem 1, so many of the details will be
left out. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we start by selecting some e from E
with kek ￿ 3 and endow E with the vector ordering￿denoted by￿￿induced by
the cone generated by feg ￿ BE. Thus E becomes an ordered Banach space with
intE￿ 6￿ ;; note that e 2 intE￿.
Choose some non-separable weakly compact subset ofE; this is possible by
hypothesis. Denoting this set by C0, let C be the closed absolutely convex hull
of C0 [ feg; of course, C is non-separable and weakly compact, too.
Denote the closed linear span of C by Y. Endowing Y with the relative norm
and the relative ordering of E, Y also becomes an ordered Banach space and we
have Y￿￿ E￿\Y. Observe that if an economyE with commodity spaceY is given,
E can be viewed as an economy with commodity space E as well. Moreover,
as may readily be veri￿ed, if E as economy with commodity space Y ful￿lls
the assumptions listed in Theorem 3, then so does E viewed as an economy
with commodity space E. (For Assumption (C4), note that intY￿ ￿ Y \ intE￿,
intY￿ meaning the interior with respect to Y, of course.) It is therefore enough
to prove Theorem 3 with Y as commodity space; so we may as well assume that
Y ￿ E, i.e that the linear span of C is dense in E.
Now since C, being weakly compact, is in particular (norm) bounded, and
since e 2 intE￿, for some number ￿ with 0 < ￿ < 1 we have feg ￿ ￿C ￿ intE￿.
Choose and ￿x such a ￿ and let K0 ￿ ￿C. Clearly K0 is weakly compact and
convex. Now let
K ￿ f￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿e ￿ z￿ ￿ ￿￿2e￿: z 2 K0;0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1g:
The following properties of the set K will be needed. First, K ￿ intE￿ because
2e 2 intE￿ and feg￿K0 ￿ intE￿. Second, K is convex and weakly compact since
K0 is. Further, since K0, being absolutely convex, contains both the point 0 and
the point ￿￿e, we have e 2 K and for ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿, ￿e 2 K as well; observe that
e ￿ ￿e 2 intE￿. Finally,
(4.11) 2e 2 K; and for all x 2 K, 2e ￿ x.
Indeed, 2e 2 K holds by the de￿nition of K. To check the second assertion, pick
any x 2 K. Then 2e￿x ￿ ￿1￿￿￿￿e￿z￿ for some 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and some z 2 K0. By
construction, feg ￿ K0 ￿ E￿, and since K0 is absolutely convex, K0 ￿ ￿K0. Hence
e ￿ z ￿ 0 whence 2e ￿ x.
19Now toward the construction of an economy, for each individual t in the
given set T of traders we let the endowment be equal toe and the consumption
set equal to K. Evidently, then, as required in Theorem 3, assumptions (C7) and,
in particular, (C7’) are satis￿ed, and from the previous paragraph, the same is
true of (A1) and (C1) to (C4). Furthermore, as required in our de￿nition of an
economy, the endowment of each agent belongs to the consumption set, and
the endowment mapping t , e is integrable (since the measure space￿T;T ;￿￿
is ￿nite).
Concerning preferences, choose elementsqt, t 2 T, and b q from E￿ precisely
as in the proof of Theorem 1, and then for each t 2 T let ut: K ! R be the
utility function de￿ned by
ut￿x￿ ￿ b q￿x￿ ￿ qt￿x￿; x 2 K:
Clearly, assumptions (A2), (A3), and, since K is convex (and each ut is the re-
striction to K of a function that is linear), (A4) and (C6) hold for this speci￿cation
of preferences. In addition￿see the proof of Theorem 1￿(A5) is satis￿ed, and
in particular we have:
If h: T ! K is any allocation then
for almost all t 2 T, ut￿h￿t￿￿ ￿ hb q;h￿t￿i.
(4.12)
Finally, regarding (C5), recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that one may assume
that for all t 2 T, ￿b q ￿ qt￿￿x￿ > 0 for each x 2 E￿￿f0g. But then, from (4.11),
we have ut￿2e￿ > ut￿x￿ for each x 2 K￿f2eg; that is, for all t 2 T, the only
satiation point of ut is 2e. Thus, since e 2 E￿ and consequently 2e ￿ e, (C5) is
satis￿ed, too.
We have thus found an economy E for the given measure space of traders
such that all the assumptions listed in the statement of Theorem 3 hold. In
particular, by Theorem 2, C￿E￿ 6￿ ;. (In fact, using (4.12) it may be seen that
C￿E￿ contains the initial allocation t , e￿cf. the last paragraph in the proof of
Theorem 1.) It remains to show that W￿E￿ ￿ ;. Proceeding by contradiction,
suppose there is a Walrasian equilibrium, say￿p;f￿. But then, in view of (4.12),
the pair ￿p;t , e￿ must be a Walrasian equilibrium as well￿see the argument
in the paragraph containing (4.4) for details. Recall now the setC from above,
and in particular, recall that (a) C is absolutely convex; (b) spanC is dense in E;
and (c) for some real number￿ > 0, feg￿￿C belongs to the consumption setK.
From (a), if z 2 spanC then for some ￿ > 0, ￿z 2 C and hence for some ￿0 > 0,
￿0z 2 ￿C.16 Therefore, because of (c), the equilibrium conditions with respect





















vi must belong to V.
20to ￿p;t , e￿ imply that for almost all t 2 T,
kerp \ spanC ￿ ker￿b q ￿ qt￿:
By virtue of (b), and since p and b q ￿ qt are continuous, it follows that in fact,
for almost all t 2 T, kerp ￿ ker￿b q ￿ qt￿.17 By the arguments in the proof of
Theorem 1, this yields a contradiction. Proof complete.
Remark 11. Note that the argument in the above proof leading to the conclusion
W￿E￿ ￿ ; is independent of whether or not the price system p is positive.
Thus, as announced in Remark 8 in Section 3.3, Theorem 3 is valid without the
requirement that an equilibrium price system be positive.
Concerning the requirement that price systems be continuous, suppose the
economy constructed in the proof of Theorem 3 would have a Walrasian equilib-
rium with a discontinuous price system, again sayp. As above, it would follow
that the pair ￿p;t , e￿ is a Walrasian equilibrium, too, and from this that for
almost every t 2 T, kerp \ spanC ￿ ker￿b q ￿ qt￿. (For both these conclusions,
continuity of the price system is not needed.) Now by construction, for allt 2 T,
b q ￿ qt is continuous so ker￿b q ￿ qt￿ is closed. Also by construction, b q ￿ qt 6￿ 0;
in particular, b q ￿ qt is non-zero on spanC, this latter set being dense in E. Let-
ting p0 be the restriction of p to spanC, our preceding observations show that
kerp0 cannot be dense in spanC. In other words, p0 is continuous; let p00 be
the (uniquely determined) extension ofp0 to an element of E￿. Evidently, then,
kerp00 \ spanC ￿ ker￿b q ￿ qt￿ for almost all t 2 T, and we thus end up as
in the original proof of Theorem 3. Consequently, as claimed in Remark 8 in
Section 3.3, Theorem 3 continues to hold when equilibrium price systems are
allowed to be discontinuous.
Finally, for the economy E constructed in the proof of Theorem 3, a non-
trivial quasi-equilibrium as de￿ned in Remark 9 must in fact be a Walrasian equi-
librium because endowments are the same for all agents. Thus, sinceW￿E￿ ￿ ;,
the set of non-trivial quasi-equilibria is empty, too. (From the preceding remarks,
this is so even when price systems may be non-positive or discontinuous). 18
Thus the claim in Remark 9 is true.
17To see this, recall the standard fact that ifZ is a real linear topological space,￿ a continuous
linear functional on Z, and A a subset of Z which is convex and dense in Z, then A \ ker￿ is
dense in ker￿.
18Of course, in the economy constructed in the proof of Theorem 3, if the linear span of the
consumption setK is not equal to the commodity spaceE then there are trivial quasi-equilibria.
Indeed, in this case, to obtain such a quasi-equilibrium take any feasible allocation and as price
system a linear functional onE which is non-zero but zero on the linear span ofK. However, if
the linear span of K is dense in E then such a price system cannot be continuous.
214.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Since we have required a Walrasian equilibrium price system to be positive, it is
clear that W￿E￿ ￿ C￿E￿. To prove the reverse inclusion, ￿rst note that in view
of assumptions (C7) and (C8), we may as well assumeE to be separable. (Indeed,
let Y denote the closed linear span of the union
S
t2T X￿t￿; by (C7) and (C8), Y is
separable. Endowing Y with the ordering induced from E, we can view E as an
economy with commodity spaceY. All assumptions of the theorem continue to
hold￿cf. the arguments in the fourth paragraph of the proof of Theorem 2￿and
in particular, Y \intE￿ 6￿ ; whence, with regard to price systems, every element
of Y￿
￿ has an extension to an element of E￿
￿ by the Krein-Rutman theorem.)




T e￿t￿d￿￿t￿; by modifying f if necessary on a null set we may
assume that in fact f￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿ for each t 2 T.
De￿ne a correspondence ’: T ! 2E by
’￿t￿ ￿ fx 2 X￿t￿: x ￿t f￿t￿g [ fe￿t￿g; t 2 T:
Then the integral
R
T ’￿t￿d￿￿t￿ is non-empty. (E.g.
R
T e￿t￿d￿￿t￿ belongs to this
set.) Moreover, since the measure space ￿T;T ;￿￿ is atomless (by hypothesis),
c‘
R
T ’￿t￿d￿￿t￿is a convex set inE. (See e.g. Yannelis, 1991, Theorem 6.2, p. 22).










\ ￿intE￿ ￿ ;:
Indeed, suppose the contrary. Then, since intE￿ is an open set, there are a v 2
intE￿￿in particular v 6￿ 0 because E￿\￿E￿ ￿ f0g)￿and an integrable function







Let S ￿ ft 2 T : g￿t￿ ￿t f￿t￿g. By Assumption (A5),S 2 T and by de￿nition of’





















Since v 6￿ 0, it follows that ￿￿S￿ > 0 and hence, since v ￿ 0, that f ￿ C￿E￿.19
But this is a contradiction, establishing the claim.
19Recall that according to our core de￿nition, all coalitions have the possibility of free dis-
posal.
22Since the set ￿intE￿ is open and convex, it follows from the separation

























Observe now that the function f being integrable is T ￿B￿E￿ measurable
since the measure space ￿T;T ;￿￿ is complete. Thus, since f￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿ for all
t 2 T, and since we have assumedE to be separable, according to part (ii) of the
lemma in the appendix we have
f￿t;x￿ 2 T ￿ E: x ￿t f￿t￿g 2 T ￿ B￿E￿:
For the same reasons as for f, the endowment mapping t , e￿t￿ is T ￿B￿E￿
measurable, and it follows that
(4.14) f￿t;x￿ 2 T ￿ E: x 2 ’￿t￿g 2 T ￿ B￿E￿:
Recall from above that
R
T ’￿t￿d￿￿t￿ is non-empty. Hence, by a well known fact,



















But by the de￿nition of ’, infhp;’￿t￿i ￿ hp;e￿t￿i for all t 2 T, and combining
this with the previous equation we ￿nd that infhp;’￿t￿i ￿ hp;e￿t￿i for almost
all t 2 T. In other words, again by the de￿nition of’:
For almost every t 2 T,
if x 2 X￿t￿ satis￿es x ￿t f￿t￿ then hp;xi ￿ hp;e￿t￿i:
(4.15)
Now note that, for any t 2 T, if f￿t￿ is not a satiation point for ￿t, then by
Assumption (C6) (￿local non-satiation at non-satiation points￿) the statement
￿hp;xi ￿ hp;e￿t￿i whenever x ￿t f￿t￿￿ implies that hp;f￿t￿i ￿ hp;e￿t￿i. If,
on the other hand, f￿t￿ happens to be a satiation point, then according to (C5),
20See e.g. Hildenbrand (1974, Proposition 6, p. 63). Actually, this latter result is stated in terms
of Rn-valued correspondences. However, as can be seen from its proof, it generalizes directly
to the context of a separable Banach space.
23f￿t￿ ￿ e￿t￿ and thus, since p ￿ 0, hp;f￿t￿i ￿ hp;e￿t￿i in this case as well.
Hence, from (4.15),





T e￿t￿d￿￿t￿ and p ￿ 0,
(4.16) hp;f￿t￿i ￿ hp;e￿t￿i for almost all t 2 T.
Finally, since p is positive and non-zero, assumptions (C4) and (A3) combine
to imply that (4.15) may be rephrased to state:
For almost every t 2 T,
if x 2 X￿t￿ satis￿es x ￿t f￿t￿ then hp;xi > hp;e￿t￿i:
(4.17)
In view of (4.17) and (4.16), we may conclude that the allocation f belongs
to W￿E￿. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Appendix
Lemma. Let Y be an ordered Banach space and let E be an economy with com-
modity space Y which satis￿es assumptions (A1) to (A3), (C2) and (C3). Suppose
Y is separable. Then given any T ￿B￿Y￿ measurable mapping f from T into Y
with f￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿ for all t 2 T, the measurability assumption (A5) implies:
(i) The set f￿t;x￿ 2 T ￿ Y : x ￿t f￿t￿g belongs to T ￿ B￿Y￿.
(ii) The set f￿t;x￿ 2 T ￿ Y : x ￿t f￿t￿g belongs to T ￿ B￿Y￿.
Proof. First note that for each t 2 T, the consumption set of t, X￿t￿, being con-
vex according to assumption (A1), is connected. Therefore, from assumptions
(A2) and (A3), for each t 2 T:
(4.18)
If D is any dense subset of X￿t￿ then given x;y 2 X￿t￿ with x ￿t y,
there is a d 2 D such that x ￿t d ￿t y.
(See e.g. Debreu, 1959, p. 57.)
Next consider the consumption sets correspondence t , X￿t￿. Denote its
graph by GX￿￿￿. Thus
GX￿￿￿ ￿ f￿t;x￿ 2 T ￿ Y : x 2 X￿t￿g:
According to Assumption (C3), GX￿￿￿ 2 T ￿ B￿Y￿ and by de￿nition of an econ-
omy each X￿t￿ is non-empty. Therefore, since the Banach spaceY is separable,
and since ￿T;T ;￿￿ is complete, the correspondence t , X￿t￿ has a Castaing
24representation. That is, there is a countable family￿hi￿
1
i￿1 of T ￿B￿Y￿ measur-
able mappings hi from T into Y such that for each t 2 T
(4.19) c‘
￿
hi￿t￿: i ￿ 1;2;:::
￿
￿ X￿t￿:
(See e.g. Castaing and Valadier, 1977, Theorem III.22, p. 74, and recall that each
X￿t￿ is closed by assumption.)
Now suppose a T ￿B￿Y￿ measurable mapping f : T ! Y has been given so
that for all t 2 T, f￿t￿ 2 X￿t￿. Consider any t 2 T and let x 2 X￿t￿. If x ￿t f￿t￿
then (a), from (4.19) and (4.18), there is an i 2 N such that x ￿t hi￿t￿ ￿t f￿t￿;
and (b), by continuity of ￿t and again by (4.19), for each n 2 N￿f0g there is a
j 2 N such that kx ￿ hj￿t￿k ￿ 1=n and hj￿t￿ ￿t hi￿t￿. Conversely, if for some
i 2 N: (a) hi￿t￿ ￿t f￿t￿ and (b) for each n 2 N￿f0g there is a j 2 N such
that kx ￿ hj￿t￿k ￿ 1=n and hj￿t￿ ￿t hi￿t￿, then x ￿t f￿t￿ because (b) implies
x ￿t hi￿t￿ and ￿t is transitive. Thus
￿




















￿t;x￿ 2 T ￿ Y : kx ￿ hj￿t￿k ￿ 1=n
￿￿
:
As already noted, GX￿￿￿ 2 T ￿ B￿Y￿. Further, according to Assumption (C2),
the correspondence t , X￿t￿ is integrably bounded, and hence the functions
f and hi;i ￿ 1;2;:::, being T ￿B￿Y￿ measurable selections of this correspon-
dence, are integrable since Y is separable. Consequently, (A5) implies that the
sets ft 2 T : hi￿t￿ ￿t f￿t￿g and ft 2 T : hj￿t￿ ￿t hi￿t￿g, i;j ￿ 1;2;::: belong
to T . Finally, by Castaing and Valadier (1977, Theorem III.41, p. 88), the sets
f￿t;x￿ 2 T ￿ Y : kx ￿ hj￿t￿k ￿ 1=ng, j;n ￿ 1;2;::: are in T ￿ B￿Y￿, again be-
cause the hj’s are T ￿B￿Y￿ measurable. Thus (ii) of the lemma follows. Analo-
gously, the set f￿t;x￿ 2 T ￿ Y : f￿t￿ ￿t xg is in T ￿ B￿Y￿, and taking the com-
plement of this set relative to GX￿￿￿, we see that (i) holds as well, using the facts
that GX￿￿￿ 2 T ￿ B￿Y￿ and ￿t is complete for each t 2 T.
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